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Implied Obviousness: Reevaluating
the Jury's Role in Nonobviousness
after Kinetic Concepts
ABSTRACT

Nonobviousness is a central patentability requirement,
requiring that a person with ordinary skill would not have found the
patented subject matter obvious. Due to its flexibility, obviousness is
the most commonly litigated requirement. It is thus crucial that the
US judicial system determine obviousness uniformly, predictably, and
accurately. However, because nonobviousness is a mixed question of
law and fact, it is often unclear how much control the judge and jury
have over the ultimate conclusion. In Kinetic Concepts v. Smith &
Nephew, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
increased the jury's role in the obviousness determination, arguably
introducing more uncertainty and inaccuracy. By applying the
Supreme Court's framework from Markman v. Westview Instruments,
this Note investigates the prudence of this expansion of the jury's
influence. Ultimately, this Note proposes that the Federal Circuit
require a prescribed special-verdict form that asks the jury to
determine the underlying factual questions in the obviousness question
while leaving the ultimate legal conclusion to the judge. Such a form
addresses many of the concerns with Kinetic Concepts raised under the
Markman framework.
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Patent litigation is sharply on the rise.' In 2011, litigants filed
a record four-thousand US patent actions-22 percent more than in
2010, and a staggering 400 percent more than in 1991.2 Damages are
growing as well; the three largest US jury verdicts of 2012 were patent
infringement cases, each resulting in awards of at least $1 billion. 3
The burgeoning litigation and rising damages mirror the increasing
value of patents in the US economy. 4 As patents gain value and
litigation becomes more prevalent, it is increasingly important to have
an accurate, predictable, and uniform method of settling patent
disputes. 5 A recent decision out of the US Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit threatens to reduce the efficacy of patent litigation by
disrupting the balance of the judge's and jury's roles in resolving such
6
disputes.
The percentage of patent cases that jury trials resolve has
increased over the last few decades-from 14 percent in the 1980s to
1.

CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 6

chartl (2012).
2.
Id.
3.
See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Patent Trial Awards Soar With Some Big Ones Cut By
Judges, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Jan. 18, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0118/patent-trial-awards-soar-with-some-big-ones-cut-by-judges.html.
4.
See id.
See infra Part I.C.
5.
6.
See infra Part II.A.
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55 percent in the 2000s. 7 As juries became the preferred fact-finder in
patent cases, commentators began to question their ability to handle
the complex legal and factual issues in high-stakes patent cases. 8
A defendant in a patent case can escape infringement entirely
by proving that the patent's subject matter fails to meet the
nonobviousness requirement. 9 "Obviousness" is the most commonly
asserted affirmative defense to patent infringement, and it became
more powerful after the Supreme Court's decision in KSR
InternationalCo. v. Teleflex, Inc., which arguably expanded the scope
of obviousness in the patent context.10 Determining obviousness is a
legal question with several underlying factual inquiries. 1 ' Because of
these overlapping factual and legal questions, scholars have heavily
disputed the jury's role in resolving this issue. 12 The Federal Circuit's
recent case Kinetic Concepts v. Smith & Nephew controversially
increased the jury's role in the obviousness determination.' 3 In that
case, the court held that judges must defer to juries' implied findings
14
of fact in determining obviousness.
This Note reevaluates the jury's role in nonobviousness in light
of the Federal Circuit's holding and proposes a prescribed
special-verdict form for obviousness that appropriately balances the
roles of judge and jury.' 5 Part I introduces the background of the
nonobviousness requirement and discusses the roles of judge and jury
in patent law, including the types of questions relegated to the
different judicial actors. 16 It explores the Supreme Court's ruling on
claim construction in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. as a
framework for evaluating the jury's role in nonobviousness. 17 It also
reviews the recent developments in Kinetic Concepts.18
BARRY, supra note 1, at 9 chart3a.
7.
See, e.g., Michael A. Sartori, An Economic Incentives Analysis of the Jury's Role in
8.
Patent Litigation, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 331, 332 (1997); Philippe Signore, On the
Role of Juries in Patent Litigation, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 791, 795-97 (2001).
See infra Part I.A.
9.
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); see John R. Allison & Mark A.
10.
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208-10
(1998).
11.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.E.
12.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see
13.
Dennis Crouch, Who Decides Obviousness: Judge or Jury?, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 17, 2012, 12:02
PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent2012/09/who-decides-obviousness-judge-or-jury.html; infra
Part II.
See infra Part I.F.
14.
See infra Parts I-IV.
15.
See infra Part I.
16.
17.
See infra Part I.D.2.
See infra Part I.F.
18.
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Part II analyzes the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Kinetic
Concepts and reevaluates the jury's role in nonobviousness in light of
the comparative advantages of judges and juries in patent law.
Applying the Supreme Court's Markman framework, this Note argues
that functional and policy concerns render the Federal Circuit's
expansion of the jury's role in obviousness imprudent. 19 Part III
proposes a prescribed special-verdict form for obviousness that strikes
the appropriate balance between the two judicial actors, alleviating
the accuracy and predictability concerns inherent in the Kinetic
Concepts approach.
I. NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE TRADITIONAL ROLES OF JUDGE AND JURY
IN PATENT LITIGATION

Nonobviousness is a central requirement of patentability,
intended to limit the grant of patent rights to inventions that would
not arise without the patent incentive. 20 Even if an invention is novel,
useful, and meets all other patentability standards, obviousness could
render a patent invalid. 21 Because of the relative ease of asserting an
obviousness defense, the obviousness question is the most commonly
contested validity issue in infringement litigation. 22 Thus, which
judicial actor determines the obviousness question plays an important
23
role in the outcome and resulting appellate review of a case.
A. History of the Nonobviousness Requirement
In 1850 the Supreme Court established a nonobviousness
requirement for patents in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, holding that
claimed subject matter must require more ingenuity than that of an
"ordinary mechanic." 24 Congress codified the requirement in section
103 of the Patent Act of 1952, which states that an inventor may not
obtain a patent if the difference between the claimed invention and
the state of the art "would have been obvious before the effective filing
date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the
25
art."

19.
See infra Part II.
20.
See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
21.
See COMPLEX LITIG. COMM. OF THE AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., ANATOMY OF APATENT CASE 45 (2009).
22.
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 10, at 208-09; infra Part I.B.
23.
See Rishi S. Suthar, Note, What Jury? A New Approach to Obviousness After KSR v.
Teleflex, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 295, 303-04 (2010).
24.
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 252-53 (1850).
25.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
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The Supreme Court addressed the nonobviousness requirement
again fourteen years later in Graham v. John Deere Company of
Kansas City, setting out a framework for the application of section 103
in light of Hotchkiss.26 In Graham, the patentee successfully sued
John Deere for infringing his patent on an improved plow design, but
the Eighth Circuit reversed. 27
Affirming the Eighth Circuit's
determination that the patent was obvious, the Supreme Court
defined the "Graham factors"-a series of inquiries against which
obviousness is evaluated-as follows: (1) the scope and content of the
prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4)
secondary considerations. 28 Secondary considerations are indicia of
obviousness that include "commercial success, long felt but unsolved
29
needs, [and] failure of others."
B. The Nonobviousness Requirement in PatentLitigation
In patent litigation, courts presume that issued patents are
valid. 30 While an examiner at the US Patent and Trademark Office
determines validity during the prosecution process, accused infringers
often challenge validity as an affirmative defense during trial. 31 In
doing so, defendants can claim a lack of patentable subject matter,
novelty, nonobviousness, utility, enablement, and other patentability
requirements. 32 For example, if the defendant can prove that the
claimed invention lacked novelty (i.e., it was patented or described in
"prior art" such as other patents or publications in the field), the
33
patent is invalid.
Out of all of the affirmative defenses available in infringement
cases, defendants most commonly assert invalidity due to
obviousness. 34 Even if the prior art does not affect the novelty of the
claims, the defendant may establish invalidity by showing that a
person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) would have found
the claimed invention obvious in view of the prior art.3 5 Obviousness

26.
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 15, 17 (1966); Hotchkiss, 52
U.S. (11 How.) at 252-53.
27.
Graham, 383 U.S. at 4.
28.
Id. at 17-18.
29.
Id.
30.
See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
31.
See COMPLEX LITIG. COMM., supranote 21, at 2, 43-45.
32.
See id. at 43-45.
33.
See id. at 44.
34.
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 10, at 210.
35.
See COMPLEX LITIG. COMM., supra note 21, at 45.
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is more hotly contested than novelty because it presents more
flexibility: whereas an invention lacks novelty only if all of the
limitations of a claim are present in a single prior art reference, 36 an
invention is unpatentable due to nonobviousness if the limitations of
37
the claim are obvious from a combination of prior art references.
Consider a simple example: in order to show that a patent
claiming a Swiss army knife including three limitations-a corkscrew,
a bottle opener, and a pair of scissors-lacks novelty, a defendant
would have to find a single piece of prior art that explicitly or
implicitly provides all three elements. 38 In contrast, three separate
prior art references-disclosing a Swiss army knife with a corkscrew,
a bottle opener, and a pair of scissors, respectively-could be combined
to prove the patent is obvious. 39 Subject to certain restrictions, if a
PHOSITA would have found the Swiss army knife claim obvious in
light of the combined references, the patent is invalid due to
obviousness. 40
While such a simplified example makes the
nonobviousness requirement seem trivial, it plays an important role. 41
C. Policy Goals of the Nonobviousness Requirement
The US Constitution justifies the patent system as
"promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts."42 By offering
inventors a limited right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling their invention, the patent system seeks to promote innovation
and public disclosure of new inventions. 43 However, due to the gravity
of such a powerful right to exclude, the patentability requirements
36.
See Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("Accordingly, invalidity by anticipation requires that the four corners of a single, prior art
document describe every element of the claimed invention, either expressly or inherently, such
that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention without undue
experimentation.").
37.
See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416-18 (2007) (discussing
obviousness and cases where familiar elements were combined in obvious and nonobvious ways).
38.
See COMPLEX LITIG. COMM., supra note 21, at 44.
39.
See Teleflex, 550 U.S. at 415-16.
40.
Id. at 415-17. The analogous-art doctrine limits the universe of prior art that a
PHOSITA would consider references that are in the same field of endeavor, or if not in the same
field, that are "reasonably pertinent" to the particular problem the inventor is trying to solve. See
In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding toothbrush art analogous to a
hairbrush). Furthermore, there must be an indication that a PHOSITA would consider the
references together, although this requirement is less restrictive following the Supreme Court's
recent expansion of the PHOSITA's creativity in combining prior art in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc. See Teleflex, 550 U.S. at 421 ("A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.").
41.
See infra Part I.C.
42.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8,cl.8.
43.
CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 3 (2d ed. 2011).
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carefully limit the grant of patents. 44 Otherwise, excessive amounts of
obvious patents could stifle innovation and create a "thicket" of
45
insignificant patents that are expensive to search and license.
The obviousness requirement serves as a gatekeeping function
in patent law, allowing patents only for "those inventions which would
46
not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent."
Scholars describe it as creating a "patent-free zone" around the state
of the art, disallowing inventors to obtain patents by merely
substituting materials, streamlining processes, or making small
improvements. 47 Furthermore, the requirement serves to prevent
patenting of inventions that are within a PHOSITA's technical
grasp. 48 Additional policy goals of uniformity, definiteness, and
role in how judges decide cases
predictability play an important
49
nonobviousness.
with
dealing
D. Judges and Juries in Patent Law

In patent law, as in most legal areas, juries generally resolve
issues of fact and judges resolve issues of law. 50 But the line between
51
questions of law and questions of fact is blurry and often shifts.
Generally, issues of fact include determining credibility, weighing
evidence, or drawing inferences from the evidence. 52 Questions of law
involve the application of general principles or rules to facts. 53 In

44.

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2012).

45.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 3, 7 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM'N, To

PROMOTE INNOVATION], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf.
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
46.
47.

See FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 45, at 3.

See id.
48.
49.
See Suthar, supra note 23, at 312; see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
50.
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) (describing
questions of fact for the jury and questions of law for the judge in patent law). Exceptions to this
rule exist. See, e.g., Gen. Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed.
Cir. 1994). For example, the inequitable conduct defense involves questions of fact but is an
equitable determination reserved for the judge. Id. Issues of equity have always been handled by
judges, dating back to the pre-Constitution era and the historically separate courts of equity. See
Edward E. Erickson, The Right to a Jury Trial in Equitable Cases, 69 N.D. L. REV. 559, 560
(1993). Additionally, when neither party requests a jury, judges often hold bench trials, where
the judge serves as the fact-finder in addition to his usual roles. See FED. R. CIV. P. 39(b).
51.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 798-99.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("Credibility
52.
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict.").
Signore, supra note 8, at 798-99.
53.
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reality, many issues are a mix of factual and legal inquiries. 5 4 For
example, obviousness is a legal determination with underlying
5
questions of fact.1
Juries play an important role in patent law. 56 In a patent jury
trial, a jury may decide anything from broad questions of novelty or
utility to narrow questions of fact relevant to obviousness,
enablement, or prior use.57 Infringement is nearly always a question
of fact for the jury, as is the amount of damages. 58 Even issues that
are technically reserved for the judge (such as enablement,
obviousness, equivalency, and inequitable conduct) often involve
59
underlying questions of fact for the jury.
The US patent system is unique in its use of juries in patent
disputes. 60 The United Kingdom and France have specialized patent
courts that never involve juries. 61 Germany and Japan split patent
cases between specialized patent courts and regular civil courts,
neither of which impanel juries. 62 In fact, Canada, one of the few
countries other than the United States to occasionally use juries in
63
civil cases, does not allow them in patent cases.
1. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: Advisory Verdicts, Special
Verdicts, and General Verdicts with Interrogatories
Mixed questions of law and fact present an uncomfortable gray
area between the established roles of the judge and jury. 64 Courts

54.
Id.; see infra Part I.D.1.
55.
Signore, supra note 8, at 804.
56.
See id. at 794.
57.
See id. at 800-05.
58.
Id. at 805, 809.
59.
See id. at 801-08. Judges generally submit underlying questions of fact to the jury
through the use of special-verdict forms. See infra Part I.D.1.
60.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 794.
61.
See John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in
Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 766, 774 (2000); Signore, supra note 8, at
794.
62.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 794-95.
63.
See Realsearch Inc. v. Valone Kone Brunette Ltd., [2003] 4 F.C. 1012, 6-7 (Can.)
(discussing the jury system in US patent law and applying it to the judge-only system in
Canadian patent law); Jason M. Solomon, The PoliticalPuzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J.
1331, 1336 (2012) ("The United States is currently the only country that uses a jury in a large
number of civil cases .... "); see also W. A. Bogart, "Guardianof Civil Rights ... Medieval Relic':
The Civil Jury in Canada, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 305 (1999) (discussing the relatively
rare use of civil juries in Canada).
64.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 799.
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have several tools to navigate this balance, including advisory
65
verdicts, special verdicts, and general verdicts with interrogatories.
Advisory verdicts are nonbinding questions to the jury in the
form of a general- or special-verdict form. 66 They provide the judge
with advisory findings but reserve the judge's discretion to
independently analyze the issue. 67 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
39(c)(1) limits advisory verdicts to cases not usually triable before a
jury, however. 68 The Federal Circuit has authorized the use of
advisory verdicts for the ensnarement defense but rejected their use
for nonobviousness determinations because it is an issue triable by
69
jury.
Special verdicts allow judges to limit the role of the jury by
submitting only specific facts instead of a general verdict-for
example, by asking specific questions about the patent, the accused
product, and prior art, but not whether the patent is obvious.7 0 The
judge applies the law to the jury's factual findings and renders a
verdict. 71 Courts and scholars have lauded this verdict form as one
that compels detailed consideration of the issues while promoting
transparency-both to the parties and appellate courts. 72 The Federal
Circuit endorsed the special-verdict form in patent law as a
particularly useful tool because of the "nuances of patent law
combined with the added complications of technology." 73 In the
nonobviousness context, a special-verdict form could limit jury
findings to the Graham factors and secondary considerations while
74
reserving the ultimate obviousness question for the judge.
65.
E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 39(c) (allowing for advisory juries); FED. R. CIv. P. 49(a)
(allowing for special verdicts); FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b) (allowing for general verdict with special
interrogatories).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 39(c); see also Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 361 F.2d 124, 126
66.
(5th Cir. 1966) ("An advisory jury does no more that advise the judge; the ultimate responsibility
for finding the facts remains with the court.").
See Frostie, 361 F.2d at 126; Mitchell v. Visser, 529 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (D. Kan.
67.
1981) ("When an advisory jury is used, the ultimate responsibility for findings of fact and
conclusions of law remains with the district court."); cf. Suthar, supranote 23, at 320 (proposing
that "juries remain in patent cases but render opinions on certain matters, particularly
obviousness, in a solely advisory capacity").
68.
FED R. CIV. P. 39(c)(1).
See Suthar, supra note 23, at 301-02, 321-22. The ensnarement defense "bars a
69.
patentee from asserting a scope of equivalency that would encompass ... the prior art." See id. at
321 (quoting Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2009)).
70.
See Signore, supranote 8, at 815-16.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a); Signore, supranote 8, at 815.
71.
72.
See Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citing Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 259 (1920)).
73.
Id.
74.
See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
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The third approach available to courts is a general verdict
75
accompanied by interrogatories-questions on specific issues of fact.
Considering nonobviousness, a jury could render a general verdict on
whether the claimed invention was obvious and additionally answer
interrogatories related to the Graham factors. 76 If the jury's factual
determinations are consistent with the general verdict, the judge must
approve the verdict, but if the jury's verdict is inconsistent with the
answers or the answers are inconsistent with each other, the judge
may (1) enter a judgment based on the interrogatories, (2) direct the
jury to further consider the answers or verdict, or (3) order a new
77
trial.
The choice of verdict form not only affects the balance between
78
the judge and jury, but also the standard of feview on appeal.
Appellate courts review juries' findings of fact for "substantial
evidence." 79 Under this highly deferential standard, a judge must
affirm a jury's conclusion if "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate" supports it.80 In contrast, appellate
courts review judges' findings of fact under the less deferential "clearly
erroneous" standard-upholding findings when "the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
81
a mistake has been committed."
2. Claim Construction and Markman
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 with the
82
purported goal of creating "nationwide uniformity" in patent law.
Accordingly, it has sought to define the role of the judge and jury in
patent cases.83 So far, the Federal Circuit has labeled many of the
most important issues in patent litigation as questions of law for the
judge, including claim interpretation and the ultimate determination

75.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).
76.
See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
77.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).
78.
Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
79.
Id.
80.
Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. NLRB., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
81.
SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 381 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)); see FED R. CIV. P.
52(a)(6).
82.
Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in
Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 529-30
(2004).
83.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 799.
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of validity.8 4 At first glance, this may seem to conflict with the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.8 5 Yet the complexity
exception, despite its controversy, justifies the reduced role of the jury
86
in patent litigation.
The complexity exception denies parties the opportunity to
have a jury trial when a jury would be ineffective because of the
length of the trial, the complexity of the facts, or the complexity of the
legal issues.8 7 The exception originated in a footnote to Ross v.
Bernhard, in which the Supreme Court suggested that the "practical
abilities and limitations of juries" should be considered in order to
determine whether an issue warrants a Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial. 88 While some argue that the Supreme Court has since
limited that language, the Court appeared to confirm its applicability
to patent law in the landmark case, Markman v. Westview Industries,
89
Inc.
In Markman, petitioner Markman sued Westview Instruments
for infringement of his patent for a system that tracks clothing
through a dry-cleaning process. 90 Although the jury found that
Westview infringed, the district court directed a verdict for Westview
based on the legal construction of the term "inventory."91 Affirming
the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court confirmed the right to a jury
trial in patent infringement cases but noted that particular issues
within a jury trial may be more appropriate for the judge. 92 To

See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996);
84.
Signore, supra note 8, at 811.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
85.
See Jennifer F. Miller, Note, Should JuriesHear Complex Patent Cases?, 2004 DUKE
86.
L. & TECH. REV. 4, 10 (2004).
87.
See id.
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
88.
See Markman v. Westview Indus., Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-90 (1996). But see Tull v.
89.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 n.4 (1987) (noting that the Court has considered the
practical limitations of a jury in administrative proceedings, but "has not used these
considerations as an independent basis for extending the right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment"); Deborah M. Altman, Comment, Defining the Role of the Jury in PatentLitigation:
The Court Takes Inventory, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 699, 706 (1997) ("In Tull v. United States, the Court
noted that an inquiry into the 'practical abilities and limitations of juries' should be made only
when considering the applicability of the Seventh Amendment to administrative law courts.").
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 374.
90.
See id. at 375. The issue in Markman concerned whether a patent for a dry cleaning
91.
"Inventory Control and Reporting System" was infringed by Westview's system that only
recorded invoices and transactions, not physical articles of clothing. Id. at 374-75. Under the
district court's construction of "inventory" as "both cash inventory and the actual physical
inventory of articlesof clothing," Westview's system did not infringe because it was not capable of
tracking particular articles of clothing throughout the dry cleaning process. Id. at 375 (emphasis
added).
See id. at 377, 388-89.
92.
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determine whether a particular issue is committed to the province of a
jury by the Seventh Amendment, the Court first endorsed a "historical
method" test, asking whether the issue "was tried at law at the time of
the founding or is at least analogous to one that was." 93 Finding no
evidence of an analogue to claim construction in historical sources, the
9 4
Court turned to functional and policy considerations.
In determining which judicial actor is "better positioned than
another" to decide an issue, the Markman Court considered the
relative skills of judges and juries.9 5 Evaluating claim construction,
the Court reasoned that judges often construe written documents and
are therefore well-equipped to interpret claim language. 96 It noted the
highly technical nature of patent claims and reasoned that a judge's
training and discipline makes her better suited than a jury to address
these issues.9 7 Thus, notwithstanding the factual underpinnings, the
Court found that judges are the preferred judicial actor to construe
claims.98
Finally, the Court turned to the policy implications of assigning
claim construction to the different judicial actors.9 9 It stressed the
importance of uniformity and consistency in order to avoid a "zone of
uncertainty," which would discourage innovation and deprive the
public of rights without clear boundaries.1 0 0 Uniformity would be
ill-served by allowing juries to construe documents; in contrast, stare
decisis would promote intrajurisdictional certainty by requiring
conformity with judges' prior interpretive efforts. 101
Applying
functional and policy considerations, the Court affirmed the Federal
Circuit's holding that claim construction is an issue for a judge, not a
jury.102
The Supreme Court's holding in Markman profoundly affected
patent law, giving rise to "Markman hearings"-proceedings in which
judges construe the patent claims at issue.'0 3 Because infringement
93.
Id. at 376; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII, ("In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.").
94.
Id. at 388-90.
95.
See id. at 384, 388.
96.
See id. at 388-89.
97.
See id.
98.
See id. at 390.
99.
See id. at 390-91.
100.
Id. at 390.
101.
See id. at 391.
102.
Id. at 388-91.
103.
See Frank M. Gasparo, Comment, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and its
Procedural Shock Wave: The Markman Hearing, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 723, 723-25 (1997) ("[Mlany
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depends on the scope of the claims, many cases are won or lost at
These hearings often lead to summary
Markman hearings. 10 4
judgment motions, interlocutory appeals, or settlement. 105
E. The Jury's Role in Determining Nonobviousness
Jurists have long disputed the jury's role in determining
nonobviousness. 106 Before the Federal Circuit was formed, circuit
courts split on whether the jury could decide the ultimate question of
nonobviousness. 10 7 For example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit considered a jury's obviousness determination
advisory.1 08 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
considered obviousness a complete question of fact for the jury. 10 9
Explicitly rejecting a general obviousness verdict for the jury, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit mandated that
the jury must decide the Graham factors and reserved the final
1 10
determination of obviousness for the judge.
The Federal Circuit has since adopted a hybrid approach,
considering the nonobviousness determination a mixed question of law
and fact."' Accordingly, where district courts used the jury in an
advisory capacity, the Federal Circuit held that the jury may make the
final obviousness determination. 112 As judges have broad discretion
over the jury form, no universal approach has surfaced for submitting

district courts have employed a new procedural step which has become known as a 'Markman
Trial."').
104.
See Colman B. Ragan, Saving the Lives of Drugs: Why ProceduralAmendments in
Hatch-Waxman Litigation and Certification of Markman Hearings for Interlocutory Appeal Will
Help Lower Drug Prices, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 411, 414 (2004); see also NARD, supra note 43, at 448
("Given the determinative nature of claim construction, most courts opt to hold a pre-trial
Markman hearing, typically followed by the 'winning' party filing summary judgment motions on
validity and/or infringement.").
See Gasparo, supra note 103, at 726.
105.
106.
See Suthar, supra note 23, at 303.
See id. at 300-01.
107.
108.
See Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647, 651 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
See Norfin Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 625 F.2d 357, 365 (10th Cir. 1980).
109.
110.
See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).
111.
See John Guo, Comment, Special Verdicts: An Obvious Trial Procedure for
Determining Obviousness in Patent Litigation, 40 Sw. L. REV. 513, 521 (2011).
See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("We hold
112.
that it is not error to submit the question of obviousness to the jury."); see also Richardson v.
Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1237-38 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding a jury's obviousness
decision even though the judge mistakenly presented the obviousness issue to the jury in an
advisory capacity).
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obviousness to the jury. 113 Despite a few strong dissents in the
Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court has yet to definitively rule on the
4
implications of submitting the obviousness question to the jury."
F. Kinetic Concepts: Recent Developments in Nonobviousness
The most recent development in the jury's role in
nonobviousness is the Federal Circuit case Kinetic Concepts v. Smith
& Nephew."15 The suit involved two patents for methods and
apparatuses for closing gaping wounds by applying "Negative
Pressure Wound Therapy," i.e., suction. 116 Wake Forest University
(the owner of the asserted patents) and Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (the
exclusive licensee) brought an infringement suit against Smith &
7
Nephew (S&N), alleging that S&N's upcoming product infringed."1
The primary issue in Kinetic Concepts was obviousness."18
After the district court conducted a Markman hearing, the case
proceeded to a jury trial." 9 S&N claimed invalidity as a defense,
asserting that the inventions were obvious in light of prior art
disclosing suction-based healing of fistulae and pus pockets. 120 At the
end of trial, a dispute arose about the form and content of the jury
instructions.'12 S&N wanted to submit a special-verdict form, asking
the jury to make findings regarding the Graham factors but reserving
the obviousness determination for the judge. 22 Kinetic Concepts
colorfully claimed this was "one of the worst ideas of all time."'123 After
113.
R.R. Dynamics v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding in the
context of nonobviousness that district courts have broad authority and discretion in determining
the form by which juries return verdicts).
114.
See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Michel,
J., dissenting) (lamenting the common practice of allowing juries to render general verdicts on
nonobviousness); Guo, supra note 111, at 517 ("Since the Supreme Court has not ruled on this
issue, the jury's role in determining obviousness remains a highly contentious issue.").
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has had a penchant for patent cases recently, and has reversed
the Federal Circuit several times on a number of important issues. See, e.g., Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070-71 (2011) (rejecting the Federal Circuit's
standard for the knowledge requirement of induced infringement); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 407, 414-422 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit's test for combining prior art
references for nonobviousness).
115.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
116.
See id. at 1351. The patented therapy was aimed at a problem inherent in stitches
and other common wound treatments: tissue tears due to localized tension. Id. at 1346.
117.
See id.
118.
See id.
119.
Id. at 1352.
120.
See id. at 1351-52.
121.
See id. at 1352.
122.
See id.; supra Part I.D.1.
123.
Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1353.
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extensive discussions, the judge crafted a final-verdict form, consisting
of yes-or-no questions regarding some of the Graham factors, a chart
pertaining to whether secondary considerations were present, and the
Despite submitting the
ultimate question of obviousness. 12 4
obviousness question to the jury, the judge stressed that the jury's
final determination would be "advisory. 12 5
After deliberation, the jury determined that (1) there were
other differences between the claims and the prior art in addition to
those listed, (2) most of the objective considerations favoring
nonobvious were present, (3) infringement was proven, and (4) the
patents were nonobvious.1 26 S&N moved for judgment as a matter of
law (JMOL), arguing that substantial evidence did not support the
jury's finding of nonobviousness. 27 In granting the motion, the
district court gave the jury's nonobviousness determination no
deference. 128
Wake Forest timely appealed to the Federal Circuit, which
reversed the JMOL.1 29 It first noted that in reviewing obviousness,
the appellate court must presume that the jury resolved the
underlying factual disputes in favor of the verdict, "leave
those presumed findings undisturbed if ... supported by substantial
evidence," and then examine the district court's legal conclusion of
obviousness de novo.1 30 The appellate court then rejected S&N's claim
that the "advisory" status of the jury affected the presumed factual
findings, holding instead that "advisory" simply meant that the jury
resolved a legal issue for the court. 131 It reasoned that this is a
permissible expansion of the jury's role because the judge remains the
ultimate arbiter of obviousness through the jury's legal instructions
and the consideration of motions for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or new trial. 132
The Federal Circuit then applied the jury's obviousness
conclusion to the Graham framework to determine whether the jury's
explicit and implicit findings of fact with respect to each factor were
supported by substantial evidence. 33 For the first factor-scope and
content of the prior art-the court considered the three prior art
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 1354.
See id. at 1357.
See id. at 1354.
See id. at 1355.
See id. at 1356.
Id. at 1356, 1371.
See id. at 1356-57 (citing Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
See id. at 1357-59.
See id. at 1358-59.
See id. at 1360-71; supra Part L.A (discussing the Graham factors).
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references presented to the jury and substantial amounts of conflicting
expert testimony. 134 Based on the jury's determination that S&N
failed to prove obviousness, the court inferred that the jury must have
found Wake Forest's experts more credible and persuasive on each
reference. 13 5 The court concluded that this constituted substantial
evidence that each reference's scope should be construed in Wake
1 36
Forest's favor.
Regarding the second factor-the level of ordinary skill in the
art-the court assumed that the jury must have adopted a PHOSITA
with a lower level of skill because a "less sophisticated level of skill
generally favors a determination of nonobviousness." 137 Again, this
specific inference was based solely on the jury's ultimate conclusion of
nonobviousness. 138
Considering the third factor-the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art-the court upheld the
jury's specific findings and implied that they found no reason to
combine the prior art references. 139 Finally, it determined that no
implied findings of fact were necessary for secondary considerations,
as the jury's specific findings were supported by substantial
evidence. 140
Having gathered the jury's explicit and implicit findings, the
141
court reexamined the ultimate nonobviousness conclusion de novo.
Based on the implied and explicit findings, the court held that district
court erred in granting the JMOL because S&N did not prove that the
claims were obvious. 142 Accordingly, it reversed and remanded the
143
case to the lower court.

II. THE JURY'S ROLE IN NONOBVIOUSNESS AFTER KINETIC CONCEPTS
The Federal Circuit's ruling in Kinetic Concepts restricted the
judge's role in the obviousness determination by requiring reliance on

134.
See Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1360-66.
135.
See id. at 1360-66.
136.
See id.
137.
Id. at 1366 (citing Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2011)). A less sophisticated PHOSITA favors a nonobviousness determination because
a less educated or experienced PHOSITA would be less likely to find a particular technology
obvious, and less likely to combine prior art references to solve the particular problem at hand.
See supraPart I.B (describing an example of an obviousness inquiry).
138.
See Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1366.
139.
See id. at 1366-67.
140.
See id. at 1368.
141.
Id.
142.
See id. at 1371.
143.
Id.
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the jury's implied findings of fact. 144 Evaluating the jury's role in
nonobviousness under the Markman framework illuminates whether
such expansion is appropriate. 145 When viewed in light of the
practical and policy considerations surrounding juries in patent law
disputes, it is clear that the jury's role should be limited to the
underlying factual issues and the judge should decide the obviousness
question. 146
A. The Problem with Kinetic Concepts
Although the Kinetic Concepts ruling is consistent with the
Federal Circuit's precedent regarding the jury's role
in
nonobviousness, it exacerbates problems that were already inherent in
courts' approaches.1 47 In Connell v. Sears, the Federal Circuit held
that it was not error to submit the question of obviousness to a jury,
but it made no mention of implied findings of fact. 148 In that case,
however, the court suggested in dicta that because of the complexity of
the obviousness framework, special-verdict forms should be "designed
to elicit responses to at least all the factual inquiries enumerated in
Graham."1 49 As discussed below in Part III.B, this more granular
approach to the Graham analysis would reduce the amount of implied
findings of fact and decrease the likelihood of jury errors remaining
hidden. 150 Thus, it would keep the final obviousness determination
squarely in the hands of the judge. 151 Yet, nearly thirty years later in
Kinetic Concepts, the special-verdict form sent to the jury still did not
152
include all the Graham factors.
The dissent in In re Lockwood illustrates this problem with the
prevailing Federal Circuit practice. 153 Judge Nies, joined by Judges
Archer and Plager, argued that denominating an issue as a question of
law is essentially a policy determination that a judge is better suited

144.
See infra Part II.A.
145.
See infra Part II.B.
146.
See infra Part II.B.
147.
See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1558-59
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (demonstrating the difficulty of overcoming the jury's presumption of correctness
as to the obviousness standard and implicit findings); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 722 F.2d
1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (acknowledging the potential complexity of obviousness
determinations).
148.
See Connell, 722 F.2d at 1547-48.
149.
Id. at 1547.
150.
See infra Part III.B.
151.
See infra Part III.B.
152.
See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
153.
See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting).
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to make the decision. 154 Addressing obviousness specifically, Judge
Nies reasoned that the inference that the jury answered all the
Graham factors in favor of the general verdict would lead to a skewed
judgment.155
Kinetic Concepts raises the precise issue that concerned the
dissenting judges in In re Lockwood, an issue that is difficult to justify
given the concerns about juries in patent law. 156 The appellate court
now requires lower courts to assume that the jury successfully
navigated convoluted technical and legal issues, applied the
nonobviousness framework correctly, and resolved each evidentiary
issue in favor of the general verdict.'5 7 For example, in Kinetic
Concepts, from a single yes-or-no answer, the district court had to
infer that the jury properly assessed expert testimony on three highly
technical references, determined the level of ordinary skill in the art of
negative-pressure wound therapy, and applied the appropriate legal
standard to find no reason to combine prior art references. 158 Thus,
despite the Federal Circuit denoting the ultimate obviousness
determination as a question of law, little of the decision making
remains for the judge. 159 As a result, the question is effectively
1 60
removed from the judge's purview entirely.
B. Reevaluating the Jury's Role in Nonobviousness
Evaluating juries' expanded roles in nonobviousness
determinations first requires a discussion of the competing strengths
and weaknesses of juries and judges as patent law arbiters.16 1 Juries
appear well-suited to address some issues in patent law; perhaps they
are similarly well-suited to determine whether patented subject
62
matter is obvious.
To determine the appropriate judicial actor for the obviousness
question, it is illustrative to apply the Markman framework. 163 The
154.
See id.
155.
See id.
156.
See Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1356-57; infra Part II.B.2.
157.
See Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1356-57.
158.
See id. at 1360-71; supra Parts IA, I.B.
159.
See Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1357; see also Guo, supra note 111, at 521-24
(discussing the ambiguity resulting from the Federal Circuit's treatment of obviousness as a
"mixed matter of law and fact"). A jury's findings get more deference than a judge's. See supra
notes 79-81 and accompanying text; infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
160.
See Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1356-57.
161.
See supra Part JI.B.1.
162.
See supra Part I.B.1.a. (analogizing the reasonable person to the PHOSITA and
listing the advantages of juries).
163.
See supraPart I.D.2.
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first step of the Markman analysis is the historical-method
test-asking whether the nonobviousness determination was tried at
law when the Seventh Amendment was enacted in 1791, or is
analogous to an issue that was. 16 4 The nonobviousness question did
not exist in 1791, and there was no analogous issue. 165 Where the
historical method is inconclusive, Markman directs the analysis
166
toward functional and policy considerations.
1. Functional Analysis under Markman
Applying the functional considerations of judges and juries to
nonobviousness under the Markman framework helps elucidate
whether it is prudent to expand the jury's influence in this area of
16 7
patent law.
a. Jury Competency in Patent Law
Juries are a cornerstone of the US judicial system, and the
1 68
Supreme Court has affirmed the right to a jury trial in patent cases.
Proponents of juries in patent law list several distinct advantages that
juries offer over judges, including improved credibility determinations,
the cumulative effects of a group, a fresh and focused attitude toward
the case, faster verdicts, and reduced exposure to inadmissible
evidence. 169
Credibility determinations alone are almost always questions
of fact for the jury. 170 Juries may be better equipped than judges to
evaluate credibility because such determinations are akin to everyday
judgments. 171 Other questions of fact also seem appropriate for juries;
for example, negligence claims require consideration of the reasonably

164.
See supra Part I.D.2.
165.
The doctrine didn't emerge until Hotchkiss in 1850. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52
U.S. (11 How.) 248, 252-53 (1850). Most patent litigation of that period dealt with simple novelty
and enablement cases. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996).
166.
See id. at 384.
167.
See supraPart I.D.2.
168.
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 377.
169.
See Joseph N. Hosteny, The Wisdom of Juries, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Aug. 2002, at
12, available at http://www.hosteny.com/archive/Hosteny%2008-02.pdf.
170.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict.").
171.
See Hosteny, supra note 169, at 12.
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prudent person's level of care. 172 The Federal Circuit suggested that
this is analogous to patent law's requirement that fact-finders
consider evidence or circumstances from the view of a "person having
173
ordinary skill in the art."
Juries may also have a number of potential advantages over
judges simply by virtue of being a group. 174 First, considering the
complexity and longevity of most patent trials, cumulative powers
allow the jury to absorb and remember more evidence and testimony
than a judge. 175 Additionally, an ideal jury is a cross section of
society-providing a variety of backgrounds and viewpoints. 176 Such a
representative panel guards against the possibility of bias and
177
eccentricities that individual judges might otherwise reflect.
Finally, by discussing their viewpoints during deliberation, jurors
have the opportunity to check each other's reasoning and correct
178
outrageous or incorrect opinions, assumptions, or conclusions.
179
Juries also present some practical advantages in trial.
Although jury trials may last longer, juries often render verdicts
180
within days, whereas a judge's decision may not come for months.
Additionally, juries may provide a fresh, focused perspective devoted
to the decision at hand.' 8 ' Finally, whereas juries are shielded from
inadmissible exhibits and testimony, judges themselves are

172.
See e.g., Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REV. 40, 41 (1915) ("[N]egligence is
doing what a reasonable and prudent man would not have done or not doing what such a man
would have done.").
173.
See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(reasoning that 'a person having ordinary skill in the arto' [is] not unlike the 'reasonable man'
and other ghosts in the law"). But this analogy is dubious; while a juror can easily put himself in
the shoes of a reasonable person, the view of a PHOSITA requires jurors to view evidence from
the perspective of someone with specific skills in a scientific or technical field. See Jonathan J.
Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law's PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
227, 233 (2009). Depending on the case, the PHOSITA may be anyone from an ordinary
mechanic to a medical researcher. See id. at 239. Depending on the patent, the hypothetical
PHOSITA could be as advanced as a Ph.D. with years of experience. See Polaroid Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828, 852 (D. Mass. 1985).
174.
See Hosteny, supra note 169, at 12.
175.
See id.
176.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) ("It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at
random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes.").
177.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 825.
178.
See Hosteny supra note 169, at 12.
179.
See id.; Signore, supra note 8, at 825-26.
180.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 825.
181.
See Hosteny, supra note 169, at 12.
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necessarily exposed to the inadmissible evidence in determining its
admissibility. 182
Although juries present numerous advantages, they also raise
significant concerns in patent litigation.1 8 3 The inherent complexity of
patented subject matter and legal rules, the "black-box" effect of
nonspecific jury forms, and the lack of uniformity diminish the
reliability and accuracy of jury verdicts.1 8 4 In contrast, a judge
handling the same issues would provide a more detailed record and
18 5
receive less deference on appeal.
In order to render a verdict in patent cases, juries must be able
to understand the technology at issue.1 8 6 According to recent census7
18
data less than 30 percent of US citizens have a bachelor's degree.
Thus, assuming that juries are a perfect cross section of society, less
1
than 30 percent of a typical patent jury is college educated. 88
Furthermore, patents span a wide range of fields, and many of the
claimed inventions involve cutting-edge technologies.1 8 9 Many of the
most hotly contested patent cases deal with highly technical
pharmaceutical claims, such as those in the Lipitor patent. 190 The
first claim of that heavily litigated patent reads:
[R-(R*,R*)]-2-(4-fluorophenyl)-6,-dihydroxy-5-(1-methylethyl)-3-phenyl-4[(phenylamino)-carbonyl]-lH-pyrrole-l-heptanoic acid or (2R-trans)-5-(4-fluorophenyl)-2(1-methylethyl)-N,4-diphenyl-1- [2-(tetrahydro-4-hydroxy-6-oxo-2H-pyran-2-yl)ethyl]- 1Hpyrrole-3-carboxamide; or pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof. 191

Even with experts and trial attorneys to assist, it is often challenging
for a jury to grasp the technical subject matter.192
182.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 826.
183.
See id. at 826-29.
184.
See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1538-39, 1557
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting); see also Signore, supra note 8, at 826-29 (discussing the
disadvantages of jury trials in patent litigation).
185.
See FED R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (defining the legal standard for review of a judge's
findings of fact as clear error on appeal).
See Warner-Jenkinson, 62 F.3d at 1538 ("In our review we must assume that the
186.
jury understood the technology ....").
187.

See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at

http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/
available at
tbl.233
(2012),
153
12s0233.pdf.
Cf. id. However, juries may not present a perfect cross-section of society for reasons
188.
beyond the scope of this Note.
189.
See supra Part I.C. Patentable subject matter is broad, including any "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See, e.g., Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Pfizer,
190.
Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Am. Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734
(Fed. Cir. 1987); infra note 191 and accompanying text.
U.S. Patent No. 5,273,995 (filed Feb. 26, 1991).
191.
192.
See Sartori, supra note 8, at 332-33. However, judges also struggle with the
complexities of patent law and patent subject matter. See infra Part II.B.1.b.
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Juries must also understand the complicated legal rules
applicable to patent cases. 193 Scholars recognize patent law as one of
the most complex areas of the law. 194 Additionally, the lack of pattern
jury instructions in this area has resulted in instructions so
convoluted that they seem "spoken in a foreign language." 195 In a
single trial, jurors must apply legal concepts that law students take
196
years to master.
Another cause for concern is the "black-box" effect of a jury
verdict.197 Unless the verdict form includes many specific factual
findings, it is difficult to determine on appeal what sort of analysis the
jury performed. 198 Thus, an appellate court cannot review the jury's
reasoning and must presume the jury followed the jury instructions to
make their findings.1 99 While judges also make mistakes, their
reasoning is transparent and their errors reviewable on appeal. 200
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the voluminous and complex
legal issues are overwhelming, and jurors may take shortcuts or
ignore vital requirements to reach a speedy verdict. 20 1 Juries may
193.
See Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Donald R. Dunner, Increasing Certainty in Patent
Litigation: The Need for Federal Circuit Approved Pattern Jury Instructions, 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 431, 432-33 (2001).
194.
See id. at 432.
195.
See id. at 433. For example, jurors may be expected to consider legal concepts such
as prior art references, printed publications, prosecution history estoppel, date of invention, date
of filing, the person having ordinary skill in the art, Graham factors, presumption of validity,
and more. See Signore, supra note 8, at 829.
196.
See generally NARD, supra note 43 (covering the basics of patent law for a year-long
patent law course).
197.
See Suthar, supranote 23, at 303.
198.
See id. at 304.
199.
See id.; see, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342,
1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (presuming the jury's implicit findings). The Federal Rules of Evidence
prohibit testimony regarding a jury's deliberations and analysis, creating a "black box" around
the jury's decisionmaking process. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1) (excluding juror testimony about jury
deliberations).
200.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) ("The findings and conclusions may be stated on the
record after the close of the evidence or may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision
filed by the court.").
201.
See, e.g., Bruce Carton, Jury Confusion About Verdict Form Costs Plaintiff Over
$200,000 in Damages, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Sept. 23, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://legalblogwatch.
typepad.com/legal-blog-watchl2011/09/earlier-this-month-the-court-of-appeals-of-indianaruledin-an-interesting-case-that-involved-a-jury-deciding-that-a-plaintiff.html; Steve Hansen, Are We
Kidding Ourselves with Patent Jury Trials? Lessons from Apple v. Samsung, HANSENIPLAw.COM
(Sept. 5, 2012), http://hanseniplaw.com/are-we-kidding-ourselves-with-patent-jury-trials-lessonsfrom-apple-v-samsung; Pamela Jones, Jury in Apple v. Samsung Goofed, Damages Reduced-Uh
Oh. What's Wrong With this Picture?, GROKLAW (Aug. 25, 2012,
11:30 AM),
http://www.groklaw.netlarticle.php?story=2012082510525390; Dan Levine, Jury Didn't Want to
Let Samsung Off Easy in Apple Trial: Foreman, REUTERS, Aug. 26, 2012, http://in.reuters.com
article/2012/08/25/us.apple.samsung-juror-idINBRE87009U20120825;
Mike
Masnick,
Apple/Samsung JurorsAdmit They Finished Quickly by Ignoring PriorArt & Other Key Factors,
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provide these faster verdicts at the expense of accuracy-perhaps
there is a good reason judges take so long to render a decision. 20 2
Because of the opacity of jury verdicts and a deferential standard on
appeal, even egregious injustices would typically be undetectable and
uncorrectable. 203 Further anecdotal evidence suggests that group
effects can actually be detrimental-jurors may simply defer to their
most persuasive member, negating any collective memory or
204
reasoning.
Juries also suffer from a lack of uniformity and
predictability. 205 These concerns are not new or unique to patent
law. 20 6 In 1835, Justice Story expressed his fear that "if juries were to
decide purely legal questions, it would lead to a lack of uniformity and
predictability in the law." 20 7 This need for uniformity is especially
great in patent law because the value of a patent depends on the
patent owner's ability to predictably enforce its claims. 20 8 In fact, the
inconsistent and unpredictable nature of juries was the justification
for limiting the jury's role to fact-finding. 20 9 Without certainty over
validity and claim scope, patentees' collective ability to pursue
infringers decreases, as does the value of patents. 2 10 As patents play
an increasingly important role in our economy, the need for
2 11
predictability in patent verdicts likewise grows.
b. Judge Competency in Patent Law
Compared to juries, judges provide a more detailed record and
receive less deference on appeal. 212 Accordingly, when judges make
mistakes, their reasoning is often transparent and reviewable by

TECHDIRT (Aug. 27, 2012, 9:30AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120826/23534320161
/applesamsung-jurors-admit-they-finished-quickly-ignoring-prior-art-other-key-factors.shtml
("[T]hey decided that prior art was 'bogging us down' and they might as well 'skip' it.").
202.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 825.
203.
See supra Part IJ.B.1.a.
204.
See Masnick, supra note 201.
205.
See Miller, supra note 86, at 32.
206.
See Jon P. McClanahan, The 'True' Right to a Trial by Jury: The Founders'
Formulationand Its Demise, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 791, 820 (2009) (citing United States v. Battiste,
24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545)).
207.
Id.; see Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043.
208.
See Altman, supra note 89, at 724-25.
209.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 798 (citing Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial
and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1924 (1966)).
210.
See Altman, supra note 89, at 725.
211.
See id. at 699.
212.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (defining the legal standard for review of a judge's
decision as clear error on appeal).
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appellate courts. 13 Further, a judge's training and discipline may
make her better suited than a jury to handle the complexities of
14
patent litigation.
However, scholars argue that judges suffer from their own set
of disadvantages. 15 As sole arbiters, they may be susceptible to bias,
prejudice, eccentricities, or unfairness. 216 Furthermore, courts are
busy-judges must manage a demanding docket. 21 7 A high caseload
may divide their attention and prevent them from focusing completely
on a single case like jurors do. 2 18 Additionally, there are no specific
trial judges for patent cases. 219 There is no reason to believe that legal
training would allow a judge to understand the Lipitor patent any
better than a juror.220 Though this is a concern, federal judges see
more patent cases than the average juror, and their experience and
knowledge of the law allow them to focus on the factual complexities of
221
the case.
c. Relative Competencies of Judge and Jury for Nonobviousness
Functional considerations suggest that juries should not
determine the ultimate obviousness question, 222 but they should
The Graham factors and secondary
decide issues of fact. 223
considerations contain many questions of fact that involve credibility
determinations, such as evaluating expert testimony. 224 Furthermore,
collective memories and powers of observation aid juries in analyzing
fact-heavy patent cases. 225 And admissibility proceedings, which are

See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) ("The findings and conclusions may be stated on the
213.
record after the close of the evidence or may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision
filed by the court.").
214.
Cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996).
215.
See infra notes 216-219 and accompanying text.
216.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 825.
See id.
217.
See Hosteny, supra note 171, at 12.
218.
219.
See Pegram, supra note 61, at 768 ("The United States district courts have
exclusive, original jurisdiction 'of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents."').
220.
See supra Part II.B.1.a.
221.
See Miller, supra note 86, at 36 (suggesting judges are better equipped to wade
through the complex legal and factual issues than a jury).
222.
See supra Parts II.B.1.a-b.
223.
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) (describing
questions of fact as an inquiry for the jury in patent law).
See supra Part I.A (discussing the Graham factors).
224.
225.
See supra Part 1I.B.1.a.
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held outside the presence of jurors, shield the jury from potentially
226
inadmissible evidence.
While these advantages certainly support the jury's role as the
fact-finder for obviousness, they do little to justify removing the
ultimate obviousness determination from the judge. 227 The ultimate
determination, which requires balancing the Graham factors and
weighing them against secondary considerations, is far from an
"everyday judgment."228 Furthermore, protection from inadmissible
evidence is not as likely to cause unfair prejudice as in other legal
contexts, such as criminal trials. 229 Finally, a jury may not necessarily
render a faster verdict because the judge must still enter the final
230
determination.
Understanding the technology at issue is even more critical to
the obviousness inquiry than it is to claim construction. 23 1 Claim
construction requires giving meaning to the claims from the
perspective of a PHOSITA; determining obviousness requires
evaluating the claims, the prior art, and the PHOSITA's technical
knowledge.2 32
A jury bewildered by legal complexities and
incomprehensible jury charges is unlikely to effectively assess these
elements. 23 3 Even if the jurors parse their instructions, they face the
daunting task of determining whether technical claims (written in
ambiguous patent legalese) are obvious in light of equally technical
prior art. 234 Thus, while juries are appropriate judicial actors for
underlying factual determinations, functional considerations dictate
that they are ill-suited for the legal question of obviousness. 235
226.
See FED. R. EVID. 104(a), (c) (requiring hearings on preliminary questions, like
admissibility of evidence, to be conducted so that the jury cannot hear it).
227.
See infra notes 228-230 and accompanying text.
228.
See supra Part I.B. L.a.
229.
Whereas the character of the experts may be at issue in patent cases, evidence of
prior convictions, sexual abuse, and past acts are less likely to arise in patent law as they are in
other civil or criminal cases. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 403, 404, 413, 608, 609 (limiting the admissibility
of evidence based on unfair prejudice, probative value, character and past acts).
230.
See, e.g., supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. Even if the question of
obviousness is effectively removed from the judge, like in Kinetic Concepts, the judge must still
write an opinion. FED. R. ClV. P. 58(a)-(c).
231.
See infra notes 232-234 and accompanying text.
232.
See Darrow, supra note 173, at 236 ("The PHOSITA standard is also relevant to
claim construction, where it is applied to determine what one of ordinary skill in the art would
have understood the claim to mean."); supra Part I.A.
233.
See supra Part II.B.1.a.
234.
See Kristen Osenga, The Shape of Things to Come: What We Can Learn from Patent
Claim Length, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 617, 653 (2012) (discussing patent
legalese); supraPart I.A.
235.
See supra Part I.D.2. Like claim construction, the complexity exceptions justifies
keeping the nonobviousness determination from the jury because of the "practical abilities and
limitations of juries." See supra Part I.D.2.
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2. Policy Analysis under Markman
Policy implications such as uniformity, public interest, and
standards of review also weigh against the jury determining
nonobviousness. 236 The same policy goals present in Markman exist
here: promoting uniformity and consistency to combat uncertainty
that discourages innovation. 237 Uncertainty as to what is obvious
would stifle innovation by making the scope of the "patent-free zone"
unclear-that is, how much substitution, minor improvements, or
streamlining is permissible without infringing. 238 Additionally, the
lack of predictability reduces the value of all issued patents, as the
239
patentee's confidence in their ability to pursue infringers wanes.
This is especially pressing for obviousness because it is often a central
240
issue in trial.
Furthermore, courts must carefully set the "obvious" bar to
promote public interest and balance the competing concerns of the US
patent system. 24 1 If too few inventions qualify as obvious, then
patents would issue for inventions that a PHOSITA would have found
obvious and thus devised without the patent incentive. 242
Consequently, this low bar would lead to a "thicket" of insignificant
patents, frustrating the goals of the patent system. 243 On the other
hand, if too many inventions qualify as obvious-that is,
overestimating what a PHOSITA would find obvious-then the result
would deny protection to inventions that would not arise without the
patent incentive. 244 These public-interest considerations go beyond
the facts of a single case, and thus exceed the jury's province. 245
Additionally, the highly deferential standard of review afforded
to juries is problematic for the obviousness determination. 246 If a jury
follows the Graham framework, an appellate court has no opportunity
to review the analysis and determine whether the reasoning is

236.
See infra notes 237-240 and accompanying text.
237.
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).
238.
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390; FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION,
supranote 45, at 3.
239.
See supra notes 208-211 and accompany text.
240.
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 10, at 208-10.
241.
See infra notes 242-244 and accompanying text.
242.
See supra Part I.C.
243.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 45, at 7; see also
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (describing the goals of the patent system to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts"); supra Part I.C.
244.
See supra Part I.C.
245.
See supra notes 241-244 and accompanying text.
246.
See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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sound. 247
Each Graham factor is a necessary part of the
nonobviousness determination; thus, if one of the appellate court's
inferences in Kinetic Concepts was inconsistent with the jury's
underlying and hidden factual determinations, the jury's ultimate
248
conclusion may not have been supported by substantial evidence.
While judges may also make mistakes or apply the law incorrectly,
their reasoning is transparent and their legal conclusions reviewable
249
de novo.
This is not to say that judges are perfectly suited for the
obviousness question. 250 Yet, their reasoning will be reviewable de
novo on appeal. 251 Thus, for functional and policy reasons, it is
imprudent to expand the jury's role in determining nonobviousness to
the point of effectively removing the judge from the legal
determination.
III.

PRESCRIBED SPECIAL-VERDICT FORMS FOR NONOBVIOUSNESS
RESTORE THE BALANCE BETWEEN JUDGE AND JURY

In Kinetic Concepts, the Federal Circuit attempted to address
the ambiguity surrounding the jury's role in the obviousness
question. 252 However, its holding effectively tied judges' hands and
forced them to accept implied factual findings that overestimate the
quality of the jury's analysis. 253 And the lower court's approach in
that case, where the jury's ultimate determination was advisory and
created no implied findings of fact, is neither desirable nor

247.
See supra notes 133-142 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1)
(excluding juror testimony about jury deliberations); supra notes 197-199 and accompanying
text. There is significant evidence that juries often fail to follow judges' instructions, especially
when faced with intricate technical and legal issues. See Mossinghoff & Dunner, supra note 193,
at 433. While deference to the venerated jury verdict plays an important role in the US legal
system, blind faith that patent juries accurately carry out the obviousness analysis is too
optimistic. See supra Part II.B. 1.a.
248.
See supra Part I.A.
249.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1) ("The findings and conclusions may be stated on the
record after the close of the evidence or may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision
filed by the court."); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (stating that questions of law
are reviewed de novo).
250.
See Signore, supra note 8, at 825 (describing the advantages of a jury trial, which
mirror some disadvantages of a bench trial). They are still subject to bias, prejudice, and the
distractions of managing a docket. See id. They may also struggle with the factual and legal
complexities inherent in patent litigation. See supra Part II.B.l.b. But their legal experience and
knowledge of the law makes them more likely to apply the Graham framework accurately,
predictably, and in a manner consistent with precedent. See supra Part I.A.
251.
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
252.
See supra Part I.F.
253.
See supra Part II.A.

696

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 16:3:669

permissible. 254 A nonbinding verdict on an issue of law adds little
value, and on appeal in Kinetic Concepts, the Federal Circuit appeared
255
to explicitly condemn such a limited verdict.
The Federal Circuit should instead create a prescribed
special-verdict form for nonobviousness-requiring the submission of
the Graham factors and secondary considerations to the jury, but not
the ultimate legal question of obviousness. 256 The jury should
determine the scope and content of the prior art references, the level
of ordinary skill in the art, the differences between the claimed
25
invention and the prior art, and list any secondary considerations. 1
Armed with the jury's explicit factual findings, the judge should
review them for substantial evidence and use them to make a final
obviousness conclusion. 258 This prescribed special-verdict form for
nonobviousness would alleviate many of the functional and policy
259
concerns of the Federal Circuit's approach in Kinetic Concepts.
Such a form addresses many of the functional concerns raised
under the Markman framework. 26 0 It appropriately balances the
strengths of the two judicial actors by ensuring that the jury makes
the necessary factual determinations but retaining the legal question
for the judge. 26 1
The jury's strength in making credibility
determinations is optimally applied to expert testimony, and potential
judicial bias on those issues is avoided. 26 2 Under this approach, jurors
avoid many of the legal questions surrounding obviousness, allowing

254.
See supra Part I.F.
255.
See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (rejecting the purely advisory status of the jury's findings); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 39(c)(1)
(permitting the court to try an issue with an advisory jury if the action is not otherwise triable of
right by a jury).
256.
See supra Part II.B. A pattern jury instruction, as seen in many torts cases, is
undesirable because the jury instruction for the Graham factors may differ greatly based on the
number and type of prior art references available in the case. See Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A.
Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 594 (2002) ("Our research indicates that forty-eight of the fifty states
now have pattern or recommended jury instructions [for negligence] .... "). But a prescribed
standard procedure for obviousness is certainly possible. The standard procedure would require
that the district court submit the Graham factors to the jury as a special verdict, but leave the
precise wording of the instructions up to the judge's discretion. See supraPart I.D. 1.
257.
See supra Part L.A (listing Graham factors); Part II.B.l.a (evaluating jury
competency).
258.
See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
259.
See Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d 1342; supra Part II.B.
260.
See supra Part II.B.
261.
See supra Part II.B.
262.
See supra Parts II.B.l.a-b.
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method
them to focus on the factual issues. 263 Furthermore, this
264
facts.
the
to
law
the
apply
enables judges to independently
This special-verdict form also addresses the policy concerns the
Federal Circuit raised in Kinetic Concepts. 265 The prescribed verdict
will increase uniformity and predictability because the judge will be
able to correct errant jury determinations and other missteps. And
the increased review on appeal will allow the Federal Circuit to
266
maintain a consistent and predictable definition of obviousness.
The value of patents will become more stable as patent owners become
more confident of their rights.267 Finally, the judge's increased control
over the final decision increases the likelihood that the obviousness
268
determination will appropriately account for the public interest.
A prescribed special-verdict form would also make the jury's
reasoning more transparent. 269 Whereas implied findings of fact
would hide a jury's mistake under Kinetic Concepts, the granular
character of the prescribed special-verdict form would expose any
error and make it reversible as a distinct factual finding. 270 Thus, this
solution would eliminate the flawed assumption that juries correctly
271
apply the law to the Graham factors and secondary considerations.
It would also shift control of the legal question back to the court,
giving the judge a check on the jury's reasoning and truly making her
272
the "ultimate arbiter" of the obviousness determination.
Concerns with special-verdict forms most commonly arise in
criminal cases, where the special verdict limits the jury's ability to
independently reach a verdict. 273 For obviousness, however, where the
jury is required to follow the structured Graham factor analysis, a
special verdict is entirely appropriate. 274 In some cases, litigants may
simply prefer a general obviousness verdict. Consider a party that
thinks that the jury is more likely than the judge to rule in their favor

See supra Part II.B.1.
263.
Without the jury's general verdict on the legal question of obviousness, the judge
264.
can independently apply the law. See, e.g., supra notes 256-258 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 266-268 and accompany text.
265.
See supranotes 246-249 and accompanying text.
266.
See supranotes 239-240 and accompanying text.
267.
See supranotes 241-245 and accompanying text.
268.
See supraPart JI.B.1.a.; see also Part L.A (listing the Graham factors).
269.
See supra Part I.D.1.
270.
See supra Part I.F (describing the Federal Circuit's analysis in Kinetic Concepts of
271.
the jury's application of the Graham factors).
See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1358-59 (Fed.
272.
Cir. 2012).
273.
See Kate H. Nepveu, Note, Beyond "Guilty" Or "Not Guilty": Giving Special Verdicts
in Criminal Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 263, 263 (2003).
See supra Part L.A (describing the Graham factors).
274.
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on obviousness. They may prefer a general obviousness verdict or a
general verdict with special interrogatories, as both of these forms
limit the judge's discretion. 2 5 Alternatively, litigants may simply
wish to avoid the lengthy process of drafting and negotiating the
content of jury instructions. However, the functional and policy
concerns of providing accurate and consistent obviousness verdicts
276
outweigh these practical concerns.
While the Federal Circuit held that submitting the ultimate
obviousness determination to the jury is not clear error, it has not
specifically endorsed the practice. 277 The Federal Circuit could require
a prescribed special verdict for nonobviousness just as the Seventh
Circuit did in the past. 278 In fact, this is precisely the approach the
Federal Circuit called for in Connell.279 The current hybrid approach
of a general verdict plus a special verdict will continue to give rise to
the issues that the implied factual findings create. 28 0 Instead, the
Federal Circuit should mandate a special verdict without a general
verdict, submitting all the factual questions at issue in the Graham
28
framework to the jury, including secondary considerations. 1
lV. CONCLUSION
As patent litigation becomes more prevalent and damages soar,
it is increasingly important to ensure that patent trials adhere to the
patent system's lofty goals. The nonobviousness requirement is one of
the most important and heavily litigated patentability requirements.
The Federal Circuit's recent Kinetic Concepts decision effectively
removed the question of obviousness from the judge by tying the
ultimate legal determination to implied findings of fact that
overestimate the quality of the jury's analysis and understanding.
Applying the
Supreme
Court's
Markman framework
to
275.
See supra Part I.D.1.
276.
See supraParts II.A-B.
277.
See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1359-60 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) ("It was not
entirely clear from Connell (even in a suit for damages) whether our precedent actually required
the validity issue to go to the jury or merely held that it was not reversible error per se to ask the
jury for a validity/invalidity verdict."); Guo supra note 112, at 523-24. But see Connell v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (suggesting that obviousness should be
submitted to the jury because of underlying questions of fact, much like the question of
negligence in other types of cases).
278.
See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1343 (7th Cir. 1983); supra
Part I.E.
279.
See Connell, 722 F.2d at 1547-48.
280.
See supra Parts I.E, II.A.
281.
See supra notes 260-272 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of this
solution).
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nonobviousness makes it clear that expanding the jury's role raises
significant functional and policy concerns. Thus, a solution is needed
that will appropriately balance the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the two judicial actors in resolving the question of obviousness.
A prescribed special-verdict form for nonobviousness would
alleviate the functional and policy concerns of Kinetic Concepts. It
should require that the judge submit the underlying factual
issues-but not the ultimate question of obviousness-to the jury.
This solution would resolve functional concerns by ensuring that the
jury explicitly determines all of the factual questions and avoiding the
optimistic assumption that the jury correctly carries out the complex
legal analysis. Furthermore, the special-verdict form advances the
patent system's goals of predictability and uniformity by increasing
transparency on appeal. Thus, in order to appropriately balance the
role of judge and jury in nonobviousness, the Federal Circuit should
prescribe a special-verdict form that includes the Graham factors and
the secondary considerations but not the ultimate question of
obviousness.
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